Country:

Hungary

Subject:

Viktor Orbán's objectives

Summary:

A lengthy interview with the Chairman of the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union, Viktor Orbán, appeared in the December 14 issue of Heti Válasz. In the course of the discussion, Orbán did not offer any new ideas, only repeated and summarised the basic tenets of the prime minister's policies since the publication of his speech at Balatonöszöd.

The political objectives of Orbán were identified most explicitly in this interview. Ostensibly, the chairman of the Fidesz expounds the reasons why the MSZP - in this form - has no place in Hungarian politics (not only in respect of its government position, but also regarding its function as a parliamentary party.) Since Orbán judges the MSZP not in terms of its policies, but on the basis of its legality - in the end, the result is the same. ('This time, the post-communist elite that has returned to power will not be able to escape the arms of the law and being taken to justice for every unlawful deed it has committed' - he said.) All this is in harmony with what the chairman of Fidesz had said earlier with respect to the government's legitimacy problems.

Analysis:

At first, the interview was received with astonishment. Following the original uproar, the government's communication machine and the leftwing media, were both shrouded in silence. The spokesperson of the MSZP made a summary judgement: 'Thus, he (Orbán) ostensibly cannot be persuaded, only defeated'. On the other hand, the prime minister resorted to an extensive citation of Istvan Bibó, and failed to recognise that Bibó's ideas were valid in an entirely different context. This might have been a suitable opportunity since the autumn for the leftwing to offer a coherent set of arguments in connection with the Orbán-programme. However, it was not able to offer substantive counter-arguments to the contents of the interview, since perhaps it had none.

In light of the reverberations regarding the interview, we have come to the conclusion, inter alia, that Orbán cannot be attacked (will not be) for the views contained therein. On the other hand, what the chairman of the Fidesz could be attacked for (will be) involves the sporadic public display and waving of the historic Árpád-striped flags at protest meetings and party rallies and not for his radical views concerning the post-communist elite, its economic strategy, or the lack of it. There is no doubt that Orbán's post-communist policy - underpinned by rigorous arguments - will be counteracted by an anti-Fascist policy, which would refer to the Árpád-striped flag as a justification. Probably, the biggest task facing the leftwing media would be to neutralise the qualitative/quantitative divergences in the two arguments.

Perhaps it would be justified to draw a distinction between the policies of Fidesz and Orbán. The positions of the former prime minister are so strong - not only within the ranks of his party, but in respect of his reasoning capacity - vis-a-vis the government too, that he might feel that he does not need the party in this contest. It is perceptible that Orbán's forceful declarations are echoed in the communication of the other Fidesz politicians - but in a milder form. It is probable that not everybody in the Fidesz understands Orbán's purposes, or do not have the confidence in his ambitious political objectives. It is a fact however, that Orbán's assertions - since the speech at Öszöd - appear as xenoliths in Hungarian politics. It is understandable that the governing parties and the leftwing media categorically rejects them without paying much attention to content of the Orbán messages - but in view of the soundness of these views, in particular their anticommunist radicalism - it is less comprehendible that there is no reverberation either in the ranks of the Fidesz, or in the otherwise soft-voiced rightwing media.

Regardless of the soundness of these ideas, a segment of Fidesz voters do not pay attention, because it is Viktor Orbán who says them. This could be explained by the fact that there is nobody to interpret and reinforce Orbán's messages. A large number of rightwing intellectuals that understand and agree with Orbán, are still denied a platform by the depleted and mostly incompetent rightwing media. Fidesz politicians that would have a voice in the country's politics, as well as the ones capable of representing Orbán's views more powerfully, either remain shrouded in silence (Kövér, Áder), stick to their sphere of expertise (Varga, Német), or prefer to deal with local politics (Pokorni, Kósa).

Conclusion:

It is possible that stipulations of the former prime minister - in spite of the feeble background-support of his party and the rightwing media - will succeed, since the government will not be able overcome the financial- and economic difficulties and thus accept a helping hand in the shape of an expert government in order to share the responsibilities. (After four and a half years of this kind of unqualified governance, the expert government would be a better 'business' from the point of view of the socialists and the free democrats.) Hence, the winner would not be Orbán, but the government would be the loser. This would not be extorted by a successful referendum, but by public discontent with respect to the austerity measures. The referendum would 'merely' express disaffection in terms of politics. If this eventuality could be interpreted as a 'mere' victory for Viktor Orbán only and not as a victory of the Fidesz and the rightwing as a whole, it would be a fragile victory indeed.