Country:

Romania

Subject:

The chances of Hungarian Representation in the European Parliament

Summary:

It is for the first time in the history of Romania that approximately one and a half million Transylvanian Hungarians can vote at general elections not only for the list of the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania (RMDSZ), but also for an independent candidate, Calvinist Bishop László Tőkés - as realistic and de facto alternative candidate. However, this entails a danger, too, namely, that votes might be split to the detriment of one or the other side and thus neither the representative of the RMDSZ, nor László Tökés would gain enough votes to reach the European Parliamentary threshold. Hungarians comprise 6-7% of the population of Romania. The RMDSZ would need 5% to reach the parliamentary threshold, while László Tőkés - as an independent candidate - needs only 2.8 per cent. The Hungarian government supports the RMDSZ. Pro-government politicians declare their allegiance in the press, or in parliament to the RMDSZ. The joint Hungarian-Romanian government meeting is scheduled to take place shortly before the elections - the timing of which is hardly circumstantial, considering that the RMDSZ is a governing party in Romania. The largest opposition party in Hungary, the Fidesz, explicitly campaigns on behalf of László Tőkés. Party chairman, Viktor Orbán, frequently attended campaign-events, as did Fidesz parliamentary vice-president, János Áder, and Fidesz chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly, Zsolt Németh.

Analysis:

On the whole, Transylvanian Hungarians have become weary of their own regime-changing elite, first and foremost of the RMDSZ. Notably, not only the performance is in the balance, but the 'old faces', too, which are no longer able to offer anything 'new'. It is not the entry into the election race of László Tőkés as an independent candidate, which is enhancing this phenomenon, but the fact that the standard of living is rising, the economic indices are positive, investments and developments are growing, pensions and wages are increasing and anti-Hungarian manifestations, which would have united the voting population - are less evident on the national level than in previous years. Since the attempts of the RMDSZ to raise the issue of Hungarian-Romanian ethnic conflicts once again are ostensibly not convincing, its campaign has tailed off.

On the basis of the opinion polls related to the Hungarians, it is difficult to forecast the prospective results, since the behaviour of the Hungarian electorate is hard to predict in the course of the research process. Their participation in previous ballots rarely reflected the forecasted results. This might be attributed to the fact that only 50% of the Hungarian populations live in settlements where they are in the majority, i.e., the polls are more reliable.

One possibility is that both the RMDSZ and László Tőkés would cross the European Parliamentary threshold. However, for this to happen, the Hungarians must cast proportionally more votes than the Romanians. There have been precedents for this. At the same time, it is hard to predict whether the prevailing dichotomies within the sphere of Hungarian politics in Romania would motivate, or discourage the Transylvanian Hungarians to partake in the elections. Larger Hungarian voter participation might be hindered by the fact that parallel to the European Parliamentary elections a referendum governing the introduction of a system of individual election constituencies is on the agenda in Romania.

It should be taken into account, too, that Romanian political communication conveys the message that the introduction of the system of individual election constituencies would wipe out corruption. This could enhance Romanian participation in the double elections. At the same time, the majority of the Romanian political parties would prefer a very low voter turnout and thus their campaign is minimal, which might achieve the opposite effect as regards voter participation. Ostensibly this would influence Hungarian participation too.

Opinion polls hitherto have indicated that both the RMDSZ and László Tőkés scored under the required entry threshold. If this were to be the final outcome of the elections too, a heated debate would emerge as to who is responsible for the failure to establish a Transylvanian Hungarian representation in the European Parliament. The problem will prevail even after the Union elections, since parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in Romania soon - probably under altered conditions. Instead of the current list voting system, the candidates might have to contest in the individual election constituencies (too).

Under such circumstances, the division might aggravate the situation of the RMDSZ, since its Hungarian opposition would demand the staging of a Hungarian pre-election in Romania in order to enter the elections on a joint platform. The Hungarian organisations that do not belong to the RMDSZ - irrespective of the present results of László Tőkés - will be able to assert that without their support, the RMDSZ did not have enough votes for the required parliamentary threshold. However, the question is as to whether some current supporters of Tőkés might vote - on the principle of 'constructive ballot' - for the RMDSZ at the evidently more important Romanian parliamentary elections, irrespective of their views on the Hungarian party.

Furthermore, a situation might arise at the elections on November 25th that only the RMDSZ, or only László Tőkés crosses the finishing line. The success of the RMDSZ might cause the Transylvanian Hungarian opposition to withdraw from the foreground for some time and the leading role of the party, led by Chairman Béla Markó, would become unchallengeable. Moreover, these eventualities would also confirm that the slogans employed in this campaign warning about the dangers of division had been effective, or that the Transylvanian Hungarians - irrespective of being critical of the RMDSZ - consider the 'constructive ballot' to be important.

If only László Tőkés were to succeed, Béla Markó would have to make considerable concessions to the opposition, which might lead to the so-called pre-elections. In this case, it would become clear that the role played by László Tőkés during the events in Temesvár (Timisoara) in 1989, still prevails in the mindset of the Hungarian electorate and that a segment of the Hungarian electorate resolved at this election to demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hungarian party. As regards the campaign - with the attacks on the Fidesz - the RMDSZ accomplishes the opposite result: every one would chronicle that the Hungarian opposition supports László Tőkés. Furthermore, the decisive majority of Transylvanian Hungarians still remember the warnings of the Hungarian governing parties with respect to the prospective influx of '23 million Romanians' during the implementation of the Status Law in 2001. The unpopularity of the Hungarian Socialist Party in Transylvania was enhanced further when prior to the referendum in Hungary on dual citizenship, Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and present Foreign Minister (Minister of Social Affairs at the time) Kinga Göncz, startled the Hungarian electorate by insisting that granting Hungarian citizenship to Transylvanian Hungarians would devastate the pension system in Hungary.

The other stake of the elections in Transylvania pertains to the influence of former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the region. The friendship and mutual respect between Viktor Orbán and László Tőkés is of common knowledge. The active participation by the leader of the Hungarian opposition in the campaign of Tőkés is probably the intension of the former to gauge: what is the magnitude of his influence on the Transylvanian Hungarian electorate. (This influence has diminished probably due to his earlier support for the increasingly less popular mayor of Székelyudvarhely, Jenő Szász) If Tőkés were to prevail, Viktor Orbán would clearly signal to Hungary, too, that he has 'won an election' once again. On the other hand, if events in Transylvania turn - from his point of view - to the worse, the fiasco would only lead to a minimal loss of prestige in Hungary. However, his popularity and influence would unquestionably decline further in Transylvania.

The RMDSZ has launched vehement attacks against Viktor Orbán in the course of the campaign. Béla Markó and associates perceive the popularity of the former prime minister in Transylvania as a source of threat and thus this occasion is a good opportunity to discredit him. In case the RMDSZ attained the 5% threshold and László Tőkés failed to reach the required 2.8% - it would mean a debacle for Orbán too. However, this is a mere theoretical possibility. It is more likely that the RMDSZ - due to the candidacy of the Calvinist pastor and the non-participation of a segment of the electorate condemning the 'division' - would not receive the necessary ballots to reach the required threshold. If the Transylvanian Hungarians end up without representation, the RMDSZ will with all certainty reproach the opposition in Hungary. However, the structure of its campaign ostensibly signals that it endeavours to achieve - in view of the approaching Romanian parliamentary elections - that Viktor Orbán should not be a decisive factor in Transylvania in the near future.

Conclusion:

From the Hungarian point of view, the outcome of the Romanian European Parliamentary elections will remain uncertain till the end. Due to the margin of error, opinion research forecasts with respect to the Transylvanian Hungarians cannot be taken for granted. The most important issue of the elections: if both sides failed, or only one side made it to parliament, would the Transylvanian Hungarians have the ability to overcome their differences. If they do not, then the modified election system would jeopardise the representation of the Transylvanian Hungarians in the Romanian Parliament, which is more important than the European Parliament. By participating in the Tőkés-campaign Viktor Orbán could win a lot, or lose a little in Hungary. While the possible fiasco of Tőkés will directly affect the popularity of Viktor Orbán in Transylvania and thus contribute to the decline of his influence, his victory would result in the enhancement of his position in Transylvania too.