Country:

The United States

Subject:

John McCain's and Barack Obama's views of the Russian-Georgian conflict and the U.S.-Russian relations

Summary:

The outbreak of the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in August provided an opportunity for the two presidential candidates to stake out their positions on some of the most pressing issues which the U.S. will be facing in the immediate future - and even beyond. These questions are the U.S.-Russia relations, the policy the U.S. should pursue in what the Kremlin calls its "near abroad" (that is, the former Soviet sphere of influence from Central Asia to the Baltic states), and energy security, especially for Washington's strategic ally, the EU.

While John McCain took the opportunity to restate his formerly known tough position on arresting Russia's traditional expansionist strategy around her borders, which has been revived by Vladimir Putin since 2000, Barack Obama remained relatively aloof during the conflict and did not go beyond calling for vigorous diplomatic actions to reach a political solution.

Moreover, in the light of the latest Russian official statement on Russia's foreign policy goals - the so-called Medvedev Doctrine - Moscow's vision of the world does not mesh with that of either of the American presidential candidates. Therefore, no matter which one of them wins the presidential election, a President McCain or a President Obama should move the issue of the U.S.-Russia relations to the top of the priorities of the new administration.

Analysis:

The Georgian-Russian conflict in August let the world have another glimpse of what it can expect from the new American administration after January 20th, 2009 in one of the central issues in international relations. The occasion contributed to a boost in the support among the American voters for the Republican candidate, who closed the gap in the opinion polls before the conventions of the two major political parties. This fact underlined the conventional wisdom, namely, that the majority of the American people have a greater confidence in the Republican Party, in general, and John McCain, in particular, than in the Democratic Party and Barack Obama respectively when it comes to the issue of handling an international crisis.

Sen. McCain took a far more skeptical view of Vladimir Putin than George W. Bush; the Senator from Arizona famously paraphrased the President's comment about his Russian counterpart that when he looks into Putin's eyes, he can see three letters: 'K, G, and B.' The Republican presidential candidate's first reaction to the Russian invasion of Georgia was another paraphrase of a Le Monde headline after September 11, 2001: 'We are all Georgians.'

The two comments disclose at least two basic convictions: one, the Soviet-era mentality in both Russian domestic and foreign affairs has survived. (It may be interesting to mention here that the 'father' of the Cold War-era containment strategy, George F. Kennan believed that Communist ideology in the Soviet Union served only to hide the traditional Russian expansionist policies.) Two, there is a global struggle between the democracies and autocracies, and the U.S. should do its best to support the former. In this regard, the 'democracy project' of the Bush Administration - of which the latest authoritative expression is Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's 'Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World' in the July/August 2008 issue of the Foreign Affairs - is likely to be carried on by a President McCain.

The Republican presidential candidate has repeatedly suggested the establishment of a 'League of Democracies' and - even before the Georgian-Russian conflict - the exclusion of Russia from the G-8. He has recently added to this list the blockading of Russia's membership in the WTO. Sen. McCain vigorously supports the deployment of the anti-missile batteries in Poland (and the radar systems in the Czech Republic) and he does not mix words saying that they might be serving as a hedge against potential threats from Russia and China. In other words: he is willing to redefine NATO as an alliance against Russia. John McCain continues to support the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (1974), which tied the granting of the Most-Favored-Nation-Treatment (MFN) in trade relations to liberal visa policies - originally it was intended to put pressure on contemporary Soviet leadership to allow more Jewish people to leave the country.

Barack Obama was taking vacation in Hawaii at the time of the outbreak of the Georgian-Russian conflict, but this fact alone does not explain his rather muted response to the events. The Democratic presidential candidate issued a short statement after the hostilities broke out in Georgia in which he condemned Russia's aggressive actions, called for immediate ceasefire, and demanded that diplomatic action be taken to reach a political solution. The only mildly directly critical comment about Moscow's behavior in the conflict was that genuine peacekeeping forces should be deployed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Sen. Obama's brief statement implied that he did not consider the conflict as so serious a step by Russia that would necessitate a strong American response. The underlying message is that the U.S. is not in a position to challenge the Russian positions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia or - by extension - in the wider region of the post-Soviet Central Asian republics. Moreover, in the spirit of a classic Realpolitik approach, the U.S. needs the cooperation of the Kremlin in a wide range of issues which affect the national security of the United States directly, including the fight against international terrorism, the prevention of the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, energy security, Iran, and North Korea besides such issues as climate change or pandemics. Therefore, Barack Obama and his foreign policy team - among others Anthony Lake, Susan Rice and Gregory Craig - are skeptical about the wisdom of deploying the anti-missile batteries in Poland; that is, "provoking" the Russians unnecessarily.

It seems prudent to take the Russian position into consideration too. President Medvedev has recently spelled out his foreign political guidelines, which is conceived in a hard-headed Realpolitik spirit. Moscow intends to work for the creation of a multipolar world; it is willing to protect the interests of Russians wherever they are. As 25 million Russians live outside of Russia, it is a doctrinal basis for intervention; and there are regions in which Russia has 'privileged interests'. On a global level, the Putin and Medvedev leadership has been engaged in balancing the power of the U.S. by trying to tie down Washington from the Middle East to Latin America as well as to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies. The Kremlin's offer is clear: Russia would consider cooperating with the U.S. in a number of issues important for Washington if the U.S. left the Russian sphere of interest alone.

However, both Sens. Obama and McCain have expressed their intention to continue the 'democracy promotion' policy of the previous administrations. The Democratic candidate has been trying to present himself to the American electorate - and the world - as a worthy successor of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy; that is, someone who can blend foreign policy with moral considerations. Sen. Obama is also very conscious of history from another point of view. He has to shed the image of Democrats (at least since George McGovern's 1972 candidacy) as 'soft' on national security. He simply cannot afford to discard the moralistic side of American foreign policy for domestic political reasons: the majority of the American people, from various considerations, still believe in the God-given mission of the U.S. in the world. In fact, he himself has raised expectations so high of a new type of leadership that a conventional Realpolitik would be a big disappointment for a lot of his supporters.

As for Sen. McCain, he is instinctively prone to shoot from the hip; second, he harbors deep personal enmities against Vladimir Putin; and third, his foreign policy advisers are a mix of Realpolitik practitioners and neo-conservatives. The latter, including his chief foreign policy adviser, Randy Scheunemann and one of the architects of the Iraq war, Robert Kagan, are pushing him towards a tougher position on the Russians - which means, among others, an eventual NATO-membership for Georgia and Ukraine. It is very likely, almost sure, that Russia will be fighting their membership, especially that of Ukraine tooth and nail and it would mean the dawn of a sort of Cold Peace.

Conclusion:

In general, it is safe to assume, that the foreign policy of the United States will not undergo a dramatic change after January 20, 2009. Shifts are possible, even likely, especially in the case of an Obama presidency, but campaign statements should not be considered as authoritative positions in a number of questions.