Country:

Croatia, Slovenia

Subject:

Border Dispute

Summary:

On 19 December 2008 Slovenia blocked eleven negotiating chapters at the accession negotiations with Croatia because it is convinced that, in the documents submitted by its neighbour to the negotiations, Croatia is prejudging, directly or indirectly, the borderline still under dispute between the two countries.  As a result Croatia, though it had hoped for the conclusion of the accession negotiations this year, could open only one new chapter out of the remaining thirteen. Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor has proposed a meeting with his Croatian counterpart to be held as soon as possible in order to settle the outstanding issues. Ivo Sanader agreed to this on condition that the representatives of the EU could be present at their discussion, too.

Analysis:

Having become independent, both Croatia and Slovenia recognized the borders fixed by the Badinter Commission. The Commission took the status quo of 25 June 1991 as the basis of its findings thereby making the internal borders between the former republics of Yugoslavia the external borders between the two successor states. As regards the inland border, there has never been any disagreement between the Croatian and Slovenian parties, while the maritime border has remained disputed ever since. In 1993 Slovenia recognized in a memorandum that it has no exit of its own to the sea. Later on, however, especially since its European Union membership became a tangible reality, Ljubljana has started to exert pressure on Croatia, figuring also on the list of aspirant EU members, in order to secure its jurisdiction over the sea corridor where the traffic of vessels coming from, and going into, the port of Koper concentrated. In 2000 Croatia, Italy and Slovenia signed a tripartite agreement in Ancona, in which the parties declared that the almost 3,5 km broad corridor constituted an international water route, and at the same time they renounced any other form of  economic exploitation of this territory. Ljubljana, however, was not satisfied with all this, since it was striving for the sovereign possession of the corridor, and not just for its unimpeded use. Two years later, Janez DrnovĹĄek and Ivica Racan, Prime Ministers of Slovenia and Croatia respectively, initialled an agreement in which Croatia made some concessions in the maritime border issue, while, in exchange, Slovenia agreed to certain border adjustments along the Mura River and the Slovenian National Assembly ratified the agreement signed with Croatia some years ago on local border traffic. The DrnovĹĄek-Racan agreement was, however, rejected by the Sabor of Croatia. Recently, Ljubljana has been arguing that it did have to make concessions itself in order to enter the EU, e.g. to Italy, and that this border is not simply one between Croatia and Slovenia, but it is a border of the EU, therefore this issue is not of bilateral nature but a matter for the whole Community. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivo Vaigl, who is at present the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, stated in an interview for the public television that Slovenia had a moral ground for claiming the sovereign maritime corridor, since it had lost the seacoast above Trieste, which almost in its entirety had been in Slovenian possession, due to great power manoeuvres after World Wars 1 and 2. Vaigl, like the majority of Slovenian politicians, claims that a compromise solution is possible and that Croatia should make a gesture to Slovenia.

In the interpretation of the Croatian party Article 14 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 is applicable to the Gulf of Trieste. Accordingly, Zagreb considers the area extending until the symbolic equidistance line in the middle of the Gulf as an area under its own control. As Croatia is convinced that the law is on its side, it wishes to decide the matter at an international conciliation forum or in court. This was first rejected by Slovenia, but then the previous Prime Minister, Janez JanĹĄa finally agreed to the Croatian proposal during talks he held with his Croatian counterpart in 2007, in Bled. However, the Left-Liberal Pahor Government, which came into power as a result of the 2008 elections, has returned to the earlier Slovenian position, and it is trying again, by "hiding behind the Union's back", to induce its neighbour to cede the territory in question. There are many, though, who do not agree with this position: they think it is not less wrong to involve the EU in this matter than to take it to an international forum. Slovenia could achieve only at bilateral level what it wants from Croatia. Davor Vidas, Croatian expert on sea law, holds the view that two countries cannot reach a compromise at the expense of international law. For Slovenia to have a sea exit of its own to international waters the Slovenian territorial waters would need to exceed the borderline set at 12 miles which would mean nothing less than at Savudrija (Istria, Croatia) bathing people would immediately step into Slovenian sea from the Croatian mainland. In any case, vessels coming from the Port of Koper may get out to the high seas by passing along the boundary (i.e. the equidistance line), fixed by the 1975 Osimo Convention between the former Yugoslavia and Italy, on the side belonging under Italian jurisdiction, it is therefore absolute necessary to include Italy in the dispute settlement. Slovenia demands now its neighbour not only that it should withdraw from the accession talks the documents prejudging - according to Slovenia - the maritime border, but also that it should not use these as supporting documents to prove its case in any future international conciliation forum. By this Slovenia went beyond the proposal made to Zagreb by the French Presidency wishing to accelerate Croatia's accession to the EU. The Slovenian demand is firmly rejected by the Croatian side.

Slovenia seems to remain alone with its position, since Brussels - in order to show an example to Serbia - wants now to move closer the date of Croatia's accession instead of postponing it. The EU Member States, however, are not at all in agreement on the mode and date of Croatia's accession. Ljubljana may count on the support of certain countries (e.g. the Netherlands, UK). Perhaps it has acted upon the tacit approval, or even encouragement, of those countries which would like to see Croatia enter the EU along with the other former republics of Yugoslavia, but, in any case, with Serbia. No matter how it might have happened, the Pahor Government needed a very strong reason to "trip up" the Croats, standing around at the EU's door-step, as its first foreign policy move.

According to the press, another issue, also unsettled since independence - namely the compensation of depositors of the Ljubljana Bank dissolved without a legal successor - may lie in the background. The stock of deposits at the affiliated bank in Zagreb is estimated to have been three billion euros before the break-up of the state union, which is about one-third of the 2009 budget of Slovenia. Slovenia wants to settle this debt through succession talks, in the context of some kind of Yugoslavian "final settlement", whereas Croatia considers it a breach of the bilateral contract between the Bank and the depositors, and it is demanding ever louder that Slovenia should settle the bill.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Macedonia have similar claims vis-à-vis Ljubljana.

The process has been dispatched by the Podobnik brothers, leaders of the Slovenian People's Party, when they tried - not without success - to acquire votes by evoking the protection of Slovenian interests. Thesucceeding governments, by paying no attention to take the wind out of the right wing's sail, yielded ground to them. Since then the border dispute has been instrumentalized by Slovenian politics: by generating incidents and fanning patriotic flames incumbent governments could divert attention from internal problems, and some parties even tried to get votes this way at the elections (e.g. the Slovenian People's Party/SLS). Nevertheless, Borut Pahor's move might turn out to be unwise. Not least, because Croatia is a primary trade partner of Slovenia. Croatia's role might get further valorised as the German economy is ailing. This conflict, however, is not helpful for economic relations. The anti-Croat hysteria has been growing for years, and even in Croatia an antipathy toward Slovenes is starting to emerge now. The leaders of Croatia ((Mesic and Sanader) have so far been wiser than their Slovenian colleagues, and the Catholic Church on both sides of the border endeavours, by smaller and larger actions, to demonstrate solidarity and friendship between the two nations. Its influence, however, does not extend to all strata of society. On behalf of the EU Presidency, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek has pronounced for the first time, a couple of days ago, a sentence which is music to Croatian ears: notably that this matter has to be resolved by an international conciliation forum or in court. The signals coming from Brussels, however, are considerably inconsistent, and they can be interpreted by both sides to their own liking.

The tension has been further escalated by the fact that the major Slovenian opposition party, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) of the former head of government, Janez JanĹĄa prevented the ratification of the protocol on Croatia's NATO accession in the National Assembly in the wake of a dispute around the implementation of the budget of the previous year. This latter has been voted on since then, while the waves aroused by the border dispute will linger on for long. Prime Minister Pahor visited London and Paris in the past few days to find supporters to his claims vis-á-vis Croatia, he refuted in the press, however, that the border dispute came up during his talks.

Brussels proposed to mediate in the matter. Its proposal is being interpreted differently by Ljubljana and Zagreb. Ljubljana hopes to avoid by this the International Court of Justice in the Hague, where international law would probably render justice to Croatia. This has been confirmed recently by an ICJ judgment passed in the case on maritime delimitation between Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea (Snake Island) in which the equidistance line was set as the border.
Zagreb welcomed the EU's helpful intention but it continues to insist that the final verdict has to be handed down by the International Court of Justice on the basis of international law and relevant international conventions in force.